This page includes Notes on The Law of Peoples, Introduction, and Parts I and II

What are "human rights"? These are rights that persons have simply by virtue of being human, i.e. not because they're born into a particular family, or live in a certain country. Rawls [§8.2] says that they include:

• right to life (subsistence and security)
• right to liberty
• right to own property
• right to equality

This is quite a pared down list of rights, and it omits several rights including freedom of expression, association and democratic participation. Beitz (Ethics, 2000, p684) asks, "why would the liberal and decent peoples be justified in establishing adherence to human rights as a threshold of membership in international society? ... does this interpretation of human rights demand too little?"

Rawls says that the attitude of decent liberal peoples (LPs) to peoples who respect human rights but are not themselves LPs should be one of toleration. Toleration means not only not interfering with, but also respecting, societies of nonliberal peoples. This because

• respect for human rights is itself sufficient to make a society immune from intervention [§10.2]
• intervention to bring about the liberalisation of another people may simply be counter-productive, resulting in resentment [§7.3]
• liberal peoples should have confidence that the values they maintain will be ones that nonliberal peoples will want to emulate [§7.3]
• there is no (selfish) advantage to be had for a LP in intervening in the affairs of another society unless that society's international conduct is "aggressive and dangerous". "No people will be willing to count the losses to itself as outweighed by gains to other peoples" [§7.2] (Beitz 2000, p685) questions whether it's safe to assume that such a society poses no threat, and whether this is a relevant moral point in the context of human rights.

It therefore follows that LPs are bound not to intervene in the affairs of other peoples who may be nonliberal, so long as they respect human rights.

Tan (Ethics 1998 p284) says that this is inconsistent; LPs are being asked to tolerate things in other societies that they would not tolerate in their own (for example, not allowing people the right to vote). "It appears that Rawls has simply relaxed the limits of toleration...to ensure that his law of peoples can be endorsed by some nonliberal states as well"

A problem with this view is that the eight principles (see [§4.1]) which Rawls argues will be derived from the original position by both LPs and decent nonliberal peoples (DNs) (Beitz (Ethics, 2000, P675) says "Offhand, there is no reason to hink that nonliberal societies, whether decent or not, would take any interest in [the Law of Peoples]".), are not justified by an appeal to reason; he says that these are the principles which would be seleced by societies of well-ordered people from behind the veil of ignorance, and says that these are "familiar and largely traditional principles I take from the history and usages of international law and practice" [§4.4]. Unlike the principles derived by individuals under the veil of ignorance, there is no justification for why these particular principles would be selected. Perhaps someone else might believe that peoples in the "second" original position would come up with a different set of principles.

Beitz (2000, p686), "The difficulty with this argument [how we decide what constitutes 'decency'] is not that it is wrong but that it is weak: if there are reasons why institutions should be held to human rights...we should be able to say what they are".

Notes on The Law of Peoples, Introduction, and Parts I and II

• Introduction
  Society of Peoples are the peoples "who follow the ideals and principles of the Law of the Peoples in their mutual relations" [p1]. May be decent liberal peoples (LP - see Part I) or decent but nonliberal (DN - see Part II).

  The Law of Peoples is concerned with the question of "whether a realistic utopia is possible, and the conditions under which it might obtain" [p5]. It "hopes to say how a world Society of liberal and decent Peoples might be possible" [p6]. It is concerned with "how peoples treat each other as peoples. How peoples treat each other and how they treat their own members are, it is important to recognize, two different things" [§11.2]

  Five types of domestic societies are considered:

  1. reasonable liberal peoples (LP)
  2. decent but nonliberal peoples (DN)
  3. outlaw states
  4. societies burdened by unfavourable conditions
  5. benevolent absolutisms
• Part I The First Part of Ideal Theory relates to LP peoples.

  Must show that reasonable pluralism "allows a society of greater political justice and liberty" [§1.1]

  Seven conditions necessary for a liberal democratic society as a realistic utopia:

  1. (realistic) we must take "people as they are...and civil laws as they might be" [§1.2(i)]
  2. (realistic) principles must be workable [§1.2(i)]
  3. (utopian) uses "political ideals, principles, and concepts to specify a reasonable and just society" [§1.2(ii)]
  4. "category of the political must contain within itself all the essential elements for a political conception of justice" [§1.2(iii)]
  5. political and social institutions lead "citizens to acquire the appropriate sense of justice as they grow up and take part in society". This leads to stability. [§1.2(iv)]
  6. social stability "must be rooted in a reasonable political conception of right and justice affirmed" [§1.2(v)]
  7. "political conception should have a reasonable idea of toleration" [§1.2(vi)]

  The above conditions apply to a reasonably just constitutional democracy; what are the parallel conditions for a reasonably just Society of Peoples?

  1. (realistic) "view peoples as they are...and the Law of Peoples as...how it could be in a reasonably just Society" [§1.3(i*)]
  2. (utopian) "uses political ideals, principles, and concepts to specify the reasonably right and just political and social arrangements for the Society of Peoples" [§1.3(ii*)]
  3. "all the essential elements for a political conception of justice be contained within the category of the political"[§1.3(iii*)]
  4. reasonable pluralism [§1.3(iv*)]
  5. no requirement for religious unity [§1.3(v*)]
  6. toleration [§1.3(vi*)]

  Is Realistic Utopia a fantasy? Rawls thinks not. "[W]e must not allow these great evils of the past and present to undermine our hope for the future" [§1.4]

  Why Peoples and Not States?

  • In a democracy, the regime "is not an autonomous agency" [§2.1]
  • Peoples don't have powers of sovereignty, e.g. "go to war in pursuit of state policies". "We must reformulate the powers of sovereignty in light of a reasonable Law of Peoples and deny to states the traditional rights to war..." [§2.2].
  • States have fundamentally different interests from peoples, e.g. power, territory [§2.3]

  Two Original Positions:

  1. choosing the basic structure of this society [§3.1]
  2. choosing a structure for Law of Peoples [§3.2]

  Principles of the Law of Peoples [§4.1]:

  1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples
  2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings
  3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them
  4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention
  5. Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defence
  6. Peoples are to honour human rights
  7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war
  8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime

  No justification given for these principles other than saying "These familiar and largely traditional principles I take from the history and usages of international law and practice", and that in the second original position, "the representatives of well-ordered peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these principles...and see no reason to depart from them" [§4.4]. Rawls also thinks that representatives of DNs would adopt the same eight principles [§8.4].

  Governments must "take responsibility for their territory and its environmental integrity, as well as for the size of their population" [§4.3]

  Two kinds of stability: "stability for the right reasons and stability as a balance of forces" [§5.1] Law of Peoples should lead to "satisfied peoples", therefore the right kind of stability. Wars between LPs are unknown since 1800 [§5.4]

• Part II The Second Part of Ideal Theory involves specifying "a decent, though not a liberal society [DN] - to be recognised as a bona fide member of ... a Society of Peoples" [§8.1].

  Toleration "means not only to refrain from exercising political sanctions...[but also] to recognize these nonliberal societies as equal participating members..." [§7.1]

  Why should LP tolerate DNs? One reason is that by definition, DNs are non-aggressive and therefore do not pose a threat, and "No people will be willing to count the losses to itself as outweighed by the gains to other peoples" [§7.2]. Another is that lack of toleration shows disrespect, which might "lead to bitterness" [§7.3]. LPs should have "confidence in their convictions" that their toleration and respect will be likely to encourage DNs to realise that they'd be better off moving towards becoming LPs themselves.

  DNs may be various types; Rawls discusses only one, namely "decent hierarchical peoples" (DHP) [§8.1]. These are defined by the following criteria [§8.2]

  1. DHPs don't have aggressive aims, and seek wider influence only in ways compatible with the independence of other societies
  2. 1. They recognises human rights
     2. They imposes bona fide recognises duties and responsibilities on persons within its territory
     3. Their judiciary sincerely believe that "the law is indeed guided by a common good idea of justice" [§8.3]

  Although persons in a DN may not enjoy the same freedoms as those in a LP, "equality may be reasonably put forward in making claims against other societies" [§8.3]

  DHPs have a "decent consultaton hierarchy", which doesn't necessarily mean all persons have the same equal right to vote, but that their is "an opportunity for different voices to be heard", and there is "the possibility of dissent" [§9.1]. Representative groups (e.g. churches) may voice different views. Rawls' example of Kazanistan illustrates six guidelines for a DHP [§9.3]:

  1. all groups must be consulted
  2. each person must belong to a group
  3. each group contains members whose interest the group represents
  4. decisions take into account views from, and be prepared to justify to, all groups
  5. decisions are made according to a "conception of the special priorities" of the society
  6. special priorities "must fit into an overall scheme of cooperation"

  Human rights honoured by both LPs and DNs and are universal: "they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlaw states" [§10.3]. Therefore any state which violates the rights is a legitimate target of sanctions and even intervention. Refusal to tolerate these states "is a consequence of liberalism and decency" [§10.3]. On the other hand, fulfillment of these rights "is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other peoples" [§10.2]