Berkeley and the mind-dependence of reality (30-Oct-2003)

Reading : Western Philosophy II.6 "Nothing Outside the Mind"

Berkeley disagrees with Descartes and Locke, who treat extension as being a quality which has resemblance to our idea of it. "An idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we look but ever so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas".

Berkeley says that an idea is something which is perceived by a thinking mind, and so cannot exist if no mind is there to perceive it. Ideas can be evoked in us in different ways:

When we perceive an object then, we perceive it as a collection of ideas caused by the way in which various qualities of the object impinge on our senses. What is happening then, when the object is not being perceived by anyone? Does it make sense to say that an apple is green if no-one can see the apple and experience the idea of green-ness which it evokes? "...it is evident that the production of ideas or sensations in our mind can be no reason why we should suppose matter or corporeal substances..."

This position is called idealism, the claim "that the physical world is in some way dependent on the conscious activity of humans" (Okasha). Realism, on the other hand, says that the physical world exists independently of human perception.

This position raises a couple of questions:

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