Ross's Rejection of System (05-Nov-2003)

Ross says that "if...it can be shown that productivity of the maximum good is not what makes all right actions right, we shall a fortiori have refuted hedonistic utilitarianism". But I believe a later phrase: "it is more important that our theory fit the facts than it be simple" reveals a problem with his argument. Moral theory should aim to be prescriptive, not descriptive: it should not be satisfied with describing how things are; it should describe how things should be.

At the start of his argument against the consequentialist position, Ross cites the example of a man fulfilling a promise, saying "That his act will produce the best possible consequences is not his reason for calling it right". This may well be true, but begs the question, "why does the man call it right"? It does seem plausible that someone in this position acts out of respect for an existing moral obligation rather than potential future consequences, but the only measure of its being "right" is the man's innate judgement.

A later example has a slightly more complex case: "if...I could bring equal amounts of good into being by fulfilling my promise and by helping some one to whom I had made no promise, I should not hesitate to regard the former as my duty". But again, while this may well be true, the valuation of moral worth here depends on the judgement of the agent.

Ross says that "ideal utilitarianism" over-simplifies things by neglecting the specific nature of relationships that we have with others, and claims that there is a moral significance in the difference between the relationship between, for example, husband and wife, and creditor and debtor. Again, this argument does seem to appeal to common-sense, and does seem to describe accurately the way that we come to a decision about how to act in a situation where we are faced with otherwise ambiguous demands. But Ross provides no justification for why these relationships should have different moral significance.

Ross says that "ideal utilitarianism" over-simplifies things by neglecting the specific nature of relationships that we have with others, and claims that there is a moral significance in the difference between the relationship between, for example, husband and wife, and creditor and debtor. Again, this argument does seem to appeal to common-sense, and does seem to describe accurately the way that we come to a decision about how to act in a situation where we are faced with otherwise ambiguous demands. But Ross provides no justification for why these relationships should have different moral significance (in fact, he says in a footnote that moral convictions "...seem to me to be, not opinions for which it is for philosophy to prove or disprove, but knowledge from the start").

So while the notion of prima facie duties is an interesting one, I believe it is built upon a dubious foundation. Much as I might like to think that my ability to make moral judgements is sufficient, I cannot believe that my judgement is perfect, or even the same as anyone else's. To me, Ross's position relies too heavily on the subjective judgement of the agent.