Reading : Western Philosophy VII.1 "Morality and Happiness"

In this extract, Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge Socrates (Plato's avatar) to show that "justice" (that is, morally good behaviour) is a good thing (not just something that we should practice because it brings us benefits).

Glaucon describes three "goods":

1. those that are enjoyable in themselves, and have no significant consequences (e.g. singing in the bath)
2. those that are enjoyable in themselves, and which also have beneficial consequences (e.g. eating a banana)
3. those that are not enjoyable in themselves, but which do have beneficial consequences (e.g. doing the ironing)

Glaucon says that at best, justice is the third type of good: practised only because people feel the consequences of behaving well (e.g. good reputation) are better than the consequences of behaving badly (retribution). Using the example of the ring of Gyges, which confers invisibility on the wearer, Glaucon suggests that if anyone believed they could behave unjustly without having to worry about being found out, then they would, which shows that justice cannot be the "highest" of goods. He says that this shows that people only ever behave well because they're worried about the consequences of not doing so.

This view could be challenged: it's maybe not true that everyone would act this way; perhaps issues of conscience would restrain them?

Glaucon also offers two alternative ways of living:

• one who behaves unjustly but enjoys the reputation of a just man
• one who behaves justly but has the reputation of an unjust man

Note this is a (deliberately?) misleading argument: there are other alternatives which Glaucon does not mention, e.g. behaving justly and having the reputation of being just. This ploy of presenting a misleading set of premises and then going on to build an argument on the basis of these premises is something we need to look out for

Before Socrates can answer, Adeimantus chips in to say that in fact it is wrong to regard justice as having good consequences either: it is not true to say people who behave justly enjoy a better life, and that people who behave unjustly suffer as a result. If you look around, it seems like unjust people do pretty nicely thank-you, and although people may say that the just person deserves respect, in fact it is the person with worldly riches, not high moral standards, whose company they crave. Even if punishment is promised in the next life, there's nothing to stop an unjust person from repenting at the last minute, and evading all consequences of his behaviour.

Socrates' response to these arguments is not contained in this passage, but describes the human soul as being split into three parts (from introduction of Waterfield's translation of "The Republic"):

1. reason (desire for understanding and truth) [~superego?]
2. spiritedness/passion (desire to preserve one's "sense of I") [~ego?]
3. desire (desire to satisfy instincts [~id?])

Socrates says that being just involves a harmony between these three elements, with reason determining desire. Because this is the harmonious state, it is attractive and desirable in itself. An unjust person has reason and desire that are not in harmony. On this basis, the benefit to being just is that you will enjoy psychic harmony. In a harmonious state, reason and desire will be at one: you will want (desire) to do what you know (reason) to be just.

There are some problems with this answer:

• Even if justice is naturally agreeable, it doesn't follow that injustice is worse: it may be better to have no harmony but get the benefits of injustice
• why should we assume that reason being in charge will cause us to behave in a just way? Perhaps reason will sometimes choose the unjust course of action
• This doesn't really answer the question of why you ought to be just, it's just providing you with an incentive to do so (you'll have a better psychic state)